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Does mutual fund investment influence accounting fraud? 
1 Introduction 
Does mutual fund investment deter accounting fraud in China? Mutual funds 
emerged in China two decades ago and with government support have experienced high 
growth, becoming the largest type of institutional investor in Chinese capital markets 
(Chi et al., 2014). Compared to individual investors, mutual funds can diversify 
investment risks and have expertise in monitoring firms’ decision making process, 
serving as an external corporate governance mechanism (Chan et al., 2014). Mutual 
funds have been previously examined with respect to improving firm performance (Ng 
et al., 2009; Lin and Fu, 2017), corporate transparency (Chan et al., 2014) and stock 
price informativeness (Ding et al., 2013). However, little is known about the association 
between mutual fund investment and accounting fraud, especially in the context of 
China, where legal enforcement is relatively low and protection of investors’ rights is 
weak.  
Using a bivariate probit model, this study examines fraud commission and 
detection separately for Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2014. It is reported mutual 
fund investment reduces listed firms’ propensity to commit fraud and increases the 
likelihood of fraud detection. This validates Chinese regulators’ efforts to develop 
mutual funds to reduce fraud. Open-end fund investment has a stronger influence on 
disciplining listed firms than closed-end fund investment and redeemable shares exert 
considerable discipline on managers. However, state ownership moderates the benefits 
of the external governance mechanism provided by mutual funds. The ability of mutual 
funds monitoring is reduced as the State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) answer more to the 
state than to the stock market.  
This study makes the following contributions to the literature. First, ambiguity as 
to the monitoring role of mutual funds in Chinese capital markets is alleviated. 
Although mutual funds are often considered to be a monitor reducing information 
asymmetries, agency problems and maximizing shareholder value (Ding et al., 2013), 
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the existing empirical evidence is mixed. For instance, Jiang and Kim (2015) express 
concerns about the small size of mutual fund shareholdings, which may result in them 
not having the power or desire to engage in shareholder activism. Lin et al. (2017) find 
that a high level of information asymmetry in China’s capital markets results in greater 
costs of monitoring and mutual funds may act passively. Distinctly this paper reports 
mutual fund investment is capable of disciplining firms detecting potential fraudulent 
behaviours.  
Second, this study highlights the constraining roles played by mutual fund 
investment and state ownership in monitoring managers and shaping the corporate 
information environment. Most Chinese listed firms have a highly concentrated 
ownership structure, with a single owner having the effective control of the listed firms. 
Many of these controlling shareholders are state and quasi-state institutions. State 
ownership has been previously portrayed as beneficial to listed firms by offering 
financial support (Wang and Yung, 2011), improving firm performance (Peng and Luo, 
2000), attracting greater investments (Shen and Lin, 2016) and facilitating business in 
uncertain environments (Hou et al., 2013). This research illuminates a negative side of 
state ownership: its role in constricting monitoring by mutual funds. In China, the state 
either directly or indirectly owns virtually all mutual funds’ management firms and 
more importantly, mutual funds engage in voting on behalf of minority shareholders. 
As a consequence, the state can apply pressure to mutual funds and the ability of mutual 
funds to discipline dishonest managers is significantly reduced (Firth et al., 2010; Ding 
et al., 2013). 
Third, a bivariate probit model is used to accommodate partial observability. Fraud 
studies (see Jia et al., 2009; Hou and Moore, 2010, Chen et al., 2013) typically rely on 
the detection of fraud for evidence of its existence. However, fraud can only be 
observed when fraudsters are punished. Past studies only consider detected fraud rather 
than the underlying population of all fraudulent activities (Stuart and Wang, 2016). In 
this study, the probability of detected fraud is considered to be the product of two latent 
probabilities: the probability of fraud commission and fraud detection. A bivariate 
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probit model is thus adopted to quantify not only the determinants of fraud commission 
and detection but also the interaction between these two latent processes (Wang, 2013).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the 
context of the study and reviews the relevant literature. The third section develops 
hypotheses, discusses the variables employed and the research model. The fourth 
section reports the empirical results and the final section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Characteristics of mutual funds 
Mutual funds are created through a contractual relationship between a fund 
management institution, a fund custodian and investors. Commercial banks are licensed 
by the CSRC to act as fund custodians and assume the responsibilities of monitoring 
fund managers’ investment activities (Neftci et al., 2007). Fund management 
institutions mainly perform duties of raising capital and handling the sale and 
registration of fund shares (Yang et al., 2014).  
China’s mutual funds industry differs from that of the U.S.A in several ways. First, 
the size of mutual funds is different: by the end of 2016, mutual funds in the U.S. were 
about 13 times larger than mutual funds in China. There were 850 registered U.S. fund 
companies with total fund holding of $16.3 trillion, accounting for about 60% of stock 
market capitalization (ICI, 2017). In contrast, there were 108 fund management 
companies in China and mutual funds’ assets accounting for only 18% of domestic 
market capitalization (AMAC, 2017). This gap reflects the dominance of individual 
investors in Chinese domestic stock markets (Hu and Chen, 2016).  
Second, mutual funds in the U.S.A are corporate entities with a specific board of 
directors (or trustees) overseeing each fund. In contrast, mutual funds in China are not 
corporate entities but contract funds, implying fewer voting rights are provided to 
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investors (Rao et al., 2016).  
Third, management fees in U.S. mutual funds are negotiated by the board of 
directors and fluctuate according to market competition and fund performance. 
Distinctly management fees in China’s mutual funds are fixed at 1.5% of total assets 
under management since 2002. Subsequently, management fees do not reveal much 
about the mutual funds’ performance in China (Rao et al., 2016). 
Fourth, mutual funds in China are mostly distributed through fund management 
companies, commercial banks or securities companies. Insurance firms play a very little 
role in the distribution of funds (Jun et al., 2014). However, in the U.S.A, mutual funds 
can be allocated through a variety of channels such as the direct channel, the advice 
channel, the retirement plan channel, the supermarket channel and the institutional 
channel (Jiang et al., 2008).1 
Fifth, the turnover among Chinese fund managers is nearly three times that of their 
U.S. counterparts. For instance, the average duration of fund managers in China is 1.68 
years while the duration of fund managers in U.S.A is about 4.8 to 4.9 years. The high 
turnover among Chinese fund managers is largely due to high labour competition, poor 
prior fund performance and job-hopping when new funds are issued (Wang and Ko, 
2017). 
Sixth, compared to the U.S. SEC, the CSRC has more power to regulate the mutual 
funds industry, including approving the establishment of fund management companies 
and electing senior managers of fund management companies (Rao et al., 2016).2 
                                                             
1 In the direct channel, investors carry out transactions directly with mutual funds. In the advice, 
retirement plan and supermarket channels, individual investors use third parties that conduct 
transactions with mutual funds on their behalf. Businesses, financial institutions, foundations 
and other institutional investors use the institutional channel to conduct transactions either 
directly with mutual funds or through third parties (Reid and Rea, 2003). 
2 Considerable differences exist between the CSRC and the SEC with regard to approving the 
establishment of fund management firms (See Article 13 and 14 of the Securities Investment 
Fund Law) and electing senior managers of fund management firms (See Article 17). Available 
at: http://english.gov.cn/services/investment/2014/08/23/content_281474982978075.htm (last 
visited on 5 June 2018). 
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Lastly, mutual funds in China have low incentives to fulfill their monitoring roles 
in firms with strong government connections. Compared to U.S. firms, a typical 
Chinese listed firm is often controlled by a large shareholder such as the state (Wong, 
2016). Firms with state-owned background have more government connections than 
private firms. In particular, Guanxi is often used as an informal governance mechanism. 
These social ties, while applauded by locals as an important channel through which one 
can build trust between parties, have been criticized by outsiders as fostering favoritism 
and collusion (Gao et al., 2014). Firms with government connections in China can be 
treated more favourably and even escape from regulatory punishments (Hou and 
Moore, 2010). Subsequently, mutual funds are reluctant to perform their monitoring 
roles. Nevertheless, as government connections do not feature in U.S. firms, mutual 
funds face lower costs of monitoring and perform their disciplinary function more 
effectively. 
 
2.2 Can mutual funds play a monitoring role? A theoretical review 
Multiple theories have advocated mutual fund investment is an important 
corporate governance mechanism to deter fraud. Compared with individual investors, 
mutual funds present greater incentives to monitor managers. This prompts firm 
managers to be more concerned about performance and shareholders, discouraging 
them from opportunism (Ding et al., 2013). In addition, as large institutional 
shareholders, they have greater voting power and more influence on share price 
movements than other institutional investors in China (Chan et al., 2014). They actively 
participate in corporate governance through proposing shareholder bills and soliciting 
proxy voting rights (Dai et al., 2013). Subsequently, incentives exist to collect 
information and monitor management, minimizing information asymmetry and 
reducing the likelihood of fraud (Lin and Fu, 2017).  
From a ‘gatekeeper’ perspective, in a universal sense, mutual funds can deter 
clients’ wrongdoing and promote compliance (Coffee, 2006). Kraakman (1986) defines 
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gatekeepers as third parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers. As gatekeepers, mutual funds have significant 
reputational capital to preserve and a lot to lose if they collude with fraudsters. They 
only make a sell decision after a careful and impartial review of a firm’s prospects, as 
a threat of exit by mutual funds is expected to cause negative stock returns (Firth et al., 
2016). Subsequently, mutual funds use their knowledge, monitoring abilities and 
competence to prevent corporate wrongdoings, to whistle-blow, to resign from, 
discharge or punish wrongdoers and to rescue individuals or organizations in dangerous 
situations (Alzola, 2017). 
Distinctly ‘cognitive evaluation’ research argues mutual funds do not play an 
active monitoring function universally (Shi et al., 2016). Here external pressures affect 
internal motivations to do what is right, leading mutual funds to only focus on short-
term investments. When a listed firm has a poor financial performance, mutual funds 
are therefore more likely to ‘vote with their feet’ through selling firm shares. To prevent 
the exit of mutual funds, firm managers are under continuous pressure to meet the short-
term earnings expectation, and engage in accounting fraud even though they know it is 
wrong (Kazemian and Sanusi, 2015). Fund managers may also pressure firm managers 
to forego long-term investments in favor of increasing short-term financial profitability 
to enhance job security and the likelihood of promotion (Graves, 1988). Mutual funds 
can therefore prompt managers to shift from an internal to an external locus of causality, 
shifting focus from honest corporate financial reporting to providing an outward 
perception of compliance (Shi et al., 2016).  
In China, the monitoring efficiency of mutual funds may also be shaped by 
‘Guanxi’ and political connections. Building Guanxi (relationship) is an important 
element of China’s business culture and key to effectively executing a business plan 
(Lin and Fu, 2017). As Guanxi dominates social life, it leads to self-interested 
behaviours such as behind-the-scenes and one-to-one meetings with firm management. 
In Chinese listed firms, fund managers are more likely to engage in more ‘informal 
communications’ with firm managers, where firm managers may secretly disclose 
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price-sensitive information and fund managers reciprocate by endorsing the firms’ 
stocks (Ding et al., 2016). Managers with strong political connections may also restrict 
mutual funds from monitoring listed firms in China. Thus, the incentives of firms to 
provide high-quality financial reporting reduce and the likelihood of fraud increases 
with the extent of political connections (Wang et al., 2017). 
 
2.3 A review of Chinese mutual fund studies 
Prior Chinese empirical findings are mixed regarding the role of mutual funds in 
corporate monitoring. Some studies claim that mutual funds have more incentives and 
ability to monitor firms and minimize agency problems. For example, Aggarwal et al. 
(2015) note Chinese mutual funds face lower costs of monitoring and acquiring 
information and can conduct in-depth analysis when investing in stocks. They hire their 
own buy-side analysts to evaluate firms, which reduces the likelihood of collusion 
between sell-side analysts and firms. Subsequently, they have incentives and abilities 
to discourage financial fraud. Chan et al. (2014) show that mutual fund ownership helps 
to reduce the incidence of modified audit opinions in Chinese listed firms. This is 
because investors attach a higher discount rate to listed firms with higher information 
asymmetry, which not only reduces the market value of less-transparent firms but also 
deteriorates the performance of mutual funds that invest in these firms. Under such 
circumstances, mutual funds have incentives to monitor firms, assisting to avoid whistle 
blowing by external auditors through modified audit opinions. 
On the other hand, some studies argue that mutual funds are short-term speculators 
and are interested in obtaining short-term trading profits based on their information 
advantages (Lin and Fu, 2017). For instance, Jiang and Kim (2015) reveal that mutual 
funds in China also have a high turnover,3 and are more likely to assume speculative 
roles and not monitor investee firms. In addition, Chen et al. (2018) find China’s mutual 
                                                             
3 For instance, the turnover rate of mutual funds in Chinese stock market was 319%, 260% and 
207% respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
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funds are largely managed by solo fund managers rather than teams,4 which makes 




3 Development of hypotheses, variables and methods 
3.1 Hypotheses development 
Mutual funds are effective institutional investors for several reasons. First, fund 
managers are pressured to provide investors with superior stock returns as their income 
is related to fund performance and size (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Fraudulent firms 
generally experience a negative stock market reaction when punishments are publicly 
disclosed, which in turn has an adverse impact on the performance of mutual funds and 
reputation of fund managers. Subsequently, mutual funds have incentives to discourage 
corporate opportunistic behaviours. Second, Chinese mutual funds are subject to 
regulatory scrutiny, required to make quarterly disclosures regarding portfolio 
compositions and adhere to pre-determined investment styles and objectives (Yuan et 
al., 2008; El Kalak et al., 2016). Third, fund managers are sophisticated investors with 
managerial skills and professional knowledge facilitating the detection of fraudulent 
activities. Using their resources to monitor and remove managers believed to be using 
fraudulent techniques to manipulate earnings, mutual funds can constrain self-serving 
managerial manipulation (Wang, 2014). In an interview conducted by Yuan et al. (2009), 
directors and senior management confirm that mutual funds are active shareholders and 
exercise influence, whereas other institutional investors tend to be passive. Fourth, 
analysts in mutual fund firms act as whistleblowers to raise suspicions of fraud to 
                                                             
4 This contrasts with the mutual funds industry in the U.S.A where team management has 
become the dominant management structure. The proportion of single managed funds in 
China’s mutual funds was approximately 70% in 2016 (Chen et al., 2018). In contrast, more 




regulators based on their assessment of firms’ abnormal performance and 
communication records with employers and employees. Subsequently, regulatory 
investigation is triggered (Dyck et al., 2010; Sun and Liu, 2011). Therefore, this study 
posits: 
H1:  Mutual fund ownership is negatively related to a firm’s propensity to commit 
fraud and positively associated with the detection of fraud. 
 
Mutual funds are then divided into open-end funds and closed-end funds to 
examine their monitoring efficiency separately. Close-end funds have a fixed number 
of shares traded on stock markets and fund shares cannot be redeemed by investors 
upon request during the term of the fund contract. In contrast, the number of shares 
outstanding in open-end funds is continuously changing and investors are allowed to 
redeem shares at the time agreed in the fund contract (Chan et al., 2008; Wei, 2016).5  
For open-end funds, the ability of investors to redeem shares can unilaterally 
remove assets from managerial control. In this way, liquid open-end funds provide 
excellent discipline to mutual fund managers: if the fund managers behave 
opportunistically and tactically collude with fraudulent firms, they will find themselves 
managing funds with less or no assets, as investors can redeem fund shares to withdraw 
the capital during the open-end fund contract and thus fund size declines (Aguilera and 
Crespi-Cladera, 2016). Subsequently, fund management fees, a major source of income 
for fund managers, decrease as the size of fees is linked to the size of assets they manage 
in China.6 In contrast, for closed-end funds, as shares cannot be redeemed during the 
fund contract, the size of fund assets and fund management fees remain unchanged. 
Subsequently, closed-end funds cannot effectively discipline listed firms and have a 
                                                             
5 Unlike closed-end funds, open-end funds do not trade on stock exchanges. Investors buy fund 
shares from investment companies and sell their shares back to the companies.  
6 This is different from western countries as management fees fluctuate based on market 
competition and fund performance. In addition, although the ‘rate’ of management fees is not 




lesser impact on fraud commission or detection (Lu et al., 2008). In addition, fund 
management firms often direct their best managerial talent to open-end funds rather 
than closed-end funds, with open-end funds outperforming closed-end funds both 
statistically and economically (MacKay and Wu, 2012). Therefore, this study posits: 
H2: Open-end fund ownership is negatively related to a firm’s propensity to commit 
fraud and positively associated with the detection of fraud; whereas closed-end 
fund ownership has no impact on fraud commission and detection. 
 
The monitoring effect of mutual funds may be less pronounced in SOEs for several 
reasons. First, SOEs are charged not only to maximize shareholder interests but to 
shoulder policy burdens, such as increasing employment rate and wages, promoting 
regional development, ensuring national security and providing low-prices goods and 
services (Wu et al., 2016). Mutual funds investing in SOEs are therefore less able to 
challenge managers’ decisions that incorporate such political considerations.  
Second, the ability of mutual funds to deter accounting fraud is expected to be 
more pronounced in firms concerned with external shareholders’ opinions. A drop in 
stock returns due to reputational losses and rising discount rates following the public 
disclosure of fraud, has more influence on the listed firms which are more reliant on 
external equity financing (Hou et al., 2013). Compared to non-SOEs, SOEs are more 
likely to receive financial support from government authorities and less likely to rely 
on the stock markets to provide funding. In particular, SOEs have preferential access to 
bank loans and face less pressure from debt covenant constraints (Shen and Lin, 2016). 
As a result, non-SOEs are more reliant on acquiring external funding for investment 
projects and growth opportunities.  
Third, managers in SOEs may restrict the monitoring role of mutual funds for their 
future promotion. Successful executives in Chinese SOEs are generally rewarded with 
promotion to government positions. When accounting fraud is revealed, managers in 
SOEs face a higher probability of being dismissed than managers in private firms since 
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the announcement of fraud damages the image of the state. These higher costs result in 
managers reducing the role of mutual funds in detecting accounting fraud (Wu et al., 
2016). 
Fourth, SOEs have more political and regulatory resources than non-SOEs, 
blunting mutual funds’ demands for high quality accounting information. In particular, 
SOEs are treated more favorably because of the political affiliation and links between 
them and the regulators (Chen et al., 2011). This can result in favorable enforcement 
outcomes or even help SOEs escaping from regulatory punishments (Hou and Moore, 
2010). Mutual funds thus have lower incentives to fulfill their monitoring role. 
Therefore, this study posits: 
H3: The monitoring role of mutual funds is moderated in SOEs. 
 
3.2 Data and variables 
The study data include all the firms listed on the China’s two stock exchanges 
from 2007 to 2014. This hand-collected dataset of accounting fraud is based on the 
sanction reports issued by regulators, and downloaded from the CSRC, ‘CNINFO’ 
website, and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites. Corporate 
governance and firm characteristics data is obtained from the CSMAR database, and 
ownership data is downloaded from the Resset database.7 An 8-year period from 2007 
to 2014 is used to accommodate the new accounting standards adopted in 2007 (Zhang 
et al., 2013).8 This paper excludes observations from the financial industry due to 
                                                             
7  There are differences regarding the proportion of institutional ownership of listed firms 
between the CSMAR and the Resset database. This is mainly caused by the distinct 
classification of institutional ownership and different definitions of ‘other institutional 
investors’. In an untabulated test, data relating to institutional ownership is collected from the 
CSMAR database to re-estimate the monitoring efficiency of mutual funds. The main results 
are not changed. 
8  The new accounting standards have largely converged with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (Zhang et al., 2013). 
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different data structures and where data is unavailable.9 The final sample consists of 
13,054 observations. 
The dependent variable is fraud commission. Fraud commission receives the value 
of 1 if a firm commits accounting fraud and zero otherwise. As fraud commission is not 
directly observable, a bivariate probit model is introduced to solve this partial 
observability problem. To implement the bivariate probit model, another dependent 
variable is introduced: fraud detection. Fraud detection equals to one if a firm is subject 
to a sanction decision imposed by regulators and zero otherwise in a firm year.  
Mutual fund ownership is captured using several variables. To examine hypothesis 
1, test variables include the ownership of mutual funds and other institutions. Other 
institutions refer to the proportion of total outstanding shares held by Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors, securities firms, insurance firms, pension, trust firms, financial 
firms and other institutional investors.10 To examine hypothesis 2, mutual funds are 
divided into open-end funds and closed-end funds based on the redeemability of the 
fund shares. Samples are divided into SOEs and non-SOEs to examine the hypothesis 
3. The identification of SOEs is based on the nature of a firm’s actual controller. Mutual 
funds related variables are included in both fraud commission and detection models. 
Following Wang (2013), control variables associated with the likelihood of fraud 
commission are included. First, this study controls for firm size using the natural 
logarithm of firm total assets. Relative to large listed firms, small listed firms are subject 
to less regulatory scrutiny and are more likely to commit fraud in order to satisfy 
analysts and investors’ expectations (Shi and Wang, 2016). CEO duality is controlled 
as CEOs who are also chairmen may have more discretion to falsify financial statements 
(Aggarwal et al., 2015). Board meeting frequency is included to predict fraud 
                                                             
9 The original sample includes 14,499 observations in total. This study first excludes 361 
observations from the financial industry and then excludes 1,084 observations with unavailable 
data. 
10  Other institutional investors include: state-owned asset management organizations, 
universities, government agencies, labour unions, research institutions, futures firms, banks and 
other asset management firms. However, as the Resset database groups them all together, the 
details of individual ownership cannot be obtained. 
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commission, as this can reflect some of the external pressures imposed on managers 
(Shi et al., 2016). Large auditors are also included as these can be more effective in 
disciplining managers and would suffer a loss of market share if they failed to so (Lisic 
et al., 2015). Supervisory board size is controlled since a larger supervisory board may 
have greater expertise in financial accounting and would be likely to stand up to a CEO 
who adopts aggressive or fraudulent accounting (Firth et al., 2007). 
The variables relating to fraud detection are included following Wang (2013). This 
paper controls for firm leverage, calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, 
as firms with higher financial leverage tend to be more closely monitored by regulators 
(Khanna et al., 2015). A firm’s sales growth rate is controlled as higher-growth firms 
can attract more attention from regulators and investors. Return on assets (ROA) as a 
firm performance predictor is included because firms with desirable financial 
performance may not attract much attention from the CSRC (Shi and Wang, 2016). 
Stock returns are also controlled to predict the likelihood of fraud detection. If a 
manager manipulates financial statements to mislead investors, regulators may trigger 
investigations. A firm’s abnormal return volatility is controlled using a firm’s demeaned 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns. Firms with higher stock return volatility 
have greater probability of being complained by investors because the likelihood of a 
big investment loss is higher. Similarly, abnormal stock turnover measured as the 
demeaned monthly stock turnover in a year is considered. Abnormal stock turnover 
measures the extent that investors are affected by firms’ stock prices (Wang, 2013).  
Two control variables are included in both fraud commission and detection 
equations. Following Wang (2013), the ratio of research and development expenditures 
(R&D) to total assets is considered. Wang (2013) finds that firms with high R&D are 
less likely to get caught for fraud and are more likely to commit fraud. Political 
connections are also controlled in two equations. Due to lower level of investor 
protection and regulatory enforcement in China, politically connected firms are more 
likely to use illegal measures to manipulate financial statements and are expected to be 
less frequently targeted by the CSRC (Wang et al., 2017).  
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This study includes corporate governance variables only in the commission model 
as a firm’s internal governance mechanisms are more likely to affect managers’ 
propensity to commit fraud rather than to trigger regulatory investigation. This is 
especially the case in China, where the board of directors, supervisors and auditors may 
persuade firm managers from committing fraud through private meetings due to the 
existence of Guanxi rather than whistle blowing on corporate misconduct to the outside 
parties i.e. regulators (Chen et al., 2006).  
Financial variables are included in the detection equation as firms with bad or 
abnormal corporate financial performance are more likely to become the target of 
regulatory investigation rather than because they affect firms’ incentives to commit 
fraud. Firms sometimes commit fraud due to financial pressure based on the fraud 
triangle theory. While this study incorporates leverage, ROA and sales growth into both 
commission and detection equations (see robustness tests), the main findings on mutual 
funds remain unchanged. Table 1 summarizes the definition of the variables. 
 
3.3 Research model 
Empirical studies on accounting fraud typically adopt a single probit or logit model 
with matched pairs, which captures the joint probability of fraud being committed and 
detected. Yet, there are two latent processes relating to accounting fraud: listed firms 
that commit fraud and those are caught by regulators. By treating detected fraud as all 
fraud, traditional methods are restricted to examining observations that have been 
caught by regulators, overlooking firms that have engaged in fraud but have not yet 
been caught (Shi et al., 2016). Moreover, there is strategic interdependence between a 
firm’s motivations to commit fraud and the extent of detection by regulators. 
Specifically, a firm’s management would estimate the likelihood of being caught prior 
to committing accounting fraud. Conversely, a regulator’s decision to investigate 
potential managerial misconduct relies on its estimation of the firms’ propensity to 
commit fraud. In other words, factors that increase the propensity of detection may 
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affect the propensity of fraud commitment. A single probit equation cannot model this 
strategic interdependence; therefore, a bivariate probit model is used to address the 








A dummy variable which is coded 1 if a firm commits accounting fraud 
and zero otherwise 
Test variables 
Mutual funds The proportion of total outstanding shares held by mutual funds 
Other institutional 
investors 
The proportion of total outstanding shares held by qualified foreign 
institutional investors, securities firms, insurance firms, pension funds, 
trust firms, financial firms and other institutional investors 
Open-end funds The proportion of total outstanding shares held by open-end funds 
Closed-end funds The proportion of total outstanding shares held by closed-end funds 
SOEs 
SOEs is a dummy variable that equal to one if a firm is controlled by 
the state, and zero otherwise 
Control variables 
Firm size Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets 
Duality Equals to one if CEOs also serve as chairmen and zero otherwise 
Board meetings The number of board meetings held in a year 
BIG4 
A dummy variable coded one if the firm auditor is one of the four 
biggest auditors and zero otherwise 
SBSIZE The number of members on the supervisory board 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets 
Political ties 
A dummy variable equals to one if the CEO is a current or former 
officer of the government, military, a member of the people’s congress 
or the Chinese People’s Political consultative conference 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by the firm’s total assets 
Growth Growth rate of total sales 
ROA Net profits divided by total assets 
Stock returns Annual firm stock returns (with cash dividend reinvested) 
Abnormal 
volatility 
The demeaned standard deviation monthly stock returns in a year 
                                                             
11 Poirier (1980) proposes a bivariate probit model to address partial observability. Addressing 
this problem is important for two reasons. First, because the fraud detection process is not 
perfect, the probability of detected fraud can be very different from the probability of fraud. 
Second, equating these two probabilities can lead to incorrect assessment of regulatory policies. 
For example, when a policy leads to a lower probability of observed fraud, we do not know 
whether this is because the policy decreases the likelihood of fraud being committed or it 
decreases the likelihood of fraud being detected and observed. 
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Abnormal turnover The demeaned monthly stock turnover in a year 
 
Some pre-tests are undertaken to examine the appropriateness of a bivariate probit 
model. First, the variance inflation factor diagnostic statistics indicate that there is no 
excessive multicollinearity with mean VIF less than 2 for the different models. Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) values between a simple probit model and a bivariate probit 
model are compared. Lower values of AIC imply a better model fit12 (Bromiley and 
Harris, 2014). The AIC statistics provide strong support for the use of bivariate probit 
models. A likelihood ratio (LR) test and a Wald test are used to evaluate the differences 
between models. The results of LR and Wald tests indicate that the mutual funds 
variables create a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the models. All test 
and control variables are lagged by one year to address potential reverse causality. 
Following Ariste et al. (2013), standard errors are clustered by firms in order to account 
for repeated observations on the same firm over time. 
Following Wang (2013), the detected accounting fraud is modeled as a function of 
the joint realizations of the two latent variables: fraud commission and fraud detection. 
𝐹𝑖
∗ represents the firm i’s potential to commit financial statement fraud, 𝐷𝑖
∗ denotes 
the firm i’s potential for being detected conditional on the firm i committing financial 
statement fraud. The reduced form model is then: 
𝐹𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝐹,𝑖𝛽𝐹 + 𝑢𝑖 (1), 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝐷,𝑖𝛽𝐷 + 𝑣𝑖 (2), 
𝑥𝐹,𝑖 is the row vector that explains firm i’s propensity to commit fraud, and 𝑥𝐷,𝑖 
contains variables that explain firm i’s potential for getting detected. 𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖 are zero-
mean disturbances with a bivariate normal distribution. The variances are normalized 
to unity as these cannot be estimated and the correlation between 𝑢𝑖  and  𝑣𝑖  is 
                                                             
12 The AIC statistic is often used for comparing maximum likelihood models and the formula 
is listed as follows. AIC=-2*ln (likelihood) + 2*k, where k is the number of parameters 
estimated. Subsequently, AIC can be viewed as measures that combine fit and complexity 
(Raftery, 1995). In the thesis, AIC values between bivariate probit models and single probit 
models for testing three different hypotheses are compared.  
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assessed to be 𝜌 (Wang, 2013). 
In order to model fraud commission, 𝐹𝑖
∗ is transferred into a binary variable 𝐹𝑖, 
where 𝐹𝑖 = 1  if 𝐹𝑖
∗ > 0 , and 𝐹𝑖 = 0  otherwise. For the fraud detection model 
(conditional on fraud commission), 𝐷𝑖
∗ is transformed into a binary variable 𝐷𝑖, where 
𝐷𝑖 = 1 if 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0, and 𝐷𝑖 = 0 otherwise. As 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐹𝑖 cannot be directly observed, 
𝑍𝑖 an interaction term between 𝐷𝑖 and 𝐹𝑖 is considered, where 
𝑍𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖 ∗  𝐷𝑖 (3), 
𝑍𝑖 = 1 if the firm i has committed fraud and also been detected. 𝑍𝑖 = 0 if the 
firm i has not committed fraud or firm i has committed fraud but has not been detected 
by regulators. The empirical specification for 𝑍𝑖 is: 
𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝐹𝑖 𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝐹𝑖 = 1, 𝐷𝑖 = 1) = Φ(𝑥𝐹,𝑖𝛽𝐹, 𝑥𝐷,𝑖𝛽𝐷 , 𝜌) (4), 
𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝐹𝑖𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝐹𝑖 = 0, 𝐷𝑖 = 0) + 𝑃(𝐹𝑖 = 1,
𝐷𝑖 = 0)  = 1 − Φ (𝑥𝐹,𝑖𝛽𝐹, 𝑥𝐷,𝑖𝛽𝐷, 𝜌) 
(5), 
 
where Φ is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function. Full 
identification of the model parameters requires that 𝑥𝐹,𝑖 and 𝑥𝐷,𝑖 in the equations 
cannot include exactly the same variables. The model can be then estimated by using 
the maximum-likelihood method with the following log-likelihood function:13 
                                                             
13 The bivariate probit model is estimated using STATA. With partial observability, only 503 
outcomes that are positive for both 𝐹𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖 are known. Thus, this paper creates a variable 
𝑍 that has 503 observations coded as 1 and 12,551 observations coded as 0. Then, STATA’s 
‘biprobit’ command is used to estimate this model. However, in order to use the biprobit 
command, two dependent variables are needed. Consequently, another variable that is identical 
to 𝑍, i.e. 𝑍2 is created. The model can be realized through the following function: biprobit 𝑍 
𝑍2 𝑋1 𝑋2 𝑋𝑛, partial. 
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𝐿(𝛽𝐹, 𝛽𝐷 , 𝜌) = ∑ log(𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 1)) +
𝑧𝑖=1
∑ log(𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 0))
𝑧𝑖=0
= ∑{𝑧𝑖 log[Φ(𝑥𝐹,𝑖𝛽𝐹, 𝑥𝐷,𝑖𝛽𝐷, 𝜌)] + (1
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝑧𝑖) log[1 − Φ(𝑥𝐹,𝑖𝛽𝐹, 𝑥𝐷,𝑖𝛽𝐷, 𝜌)]} 
(6), 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics. On average, mutual funds are the largest 
institutional investors owning 4.6% of stocks. The supervisory board on average has 
3.89 directors and 8% of the listed firms in the sample hire big four auditors.14 17.3% 
CEOs have dual positions and 13.8% CEOs have political connections. 
Table 2  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics. 







Mutual funds 0.046  0.026  0.047  0.021*** 
Other institutions 0.118 0.110 0.118 0.008 
QFII 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001** 
Securities firms 0.004  0.003  0.004  0.001  
Insurance firms 0.003  0.002  0.003  0.001*** 
Pension funds 0.003  0.002  0.003  0.001** 
Trust firms 0.003  0.005  0.003  -0.002*** 
Financial firms 0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  
Other institutional investors 0.104  0.097  0.104  0.007  
Open-end funds 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.001 
Closed-end funds 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
SOEs 0.565 0.445 0.570 0.124*** 
Firm size 21.763  21.375  21.778  0.403*** 
Duality 0.173  0.223  0.171  -0.051*** 
Board meetings 9.191 9.328 9.186 -0.142 
BIG4 0.080  0.048  0.082  0.034*** 
SBSIZE 3.894  3.682  3.902  0.220*** 
                                                             
14  Chinese government issued favourable policies to encourage the development of local 
auditors and suggested certain firms to give priority to local auditors. Subsequently, market 
shares of big four auditors are relatively low (Yang and Sung, 2017). The big four auditors 
include Deloitte, PwC, Ernst & Young and KPMG. 
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R&D 0.008  0.007  0.008  0.001  
Political ties 0.138  0.145  0.138  -0.007  
Leverage 0.656  0.721  0.653  -0.068  
Growth 12.678  1.809  13.113  11.304  
ROA 0.040  0.009  0.041  0.032  
Stock returns 0.427  0.253  0.434  0.181*** 
Abnormal volatility -0.002  0.012  -0.002  -0.014** 
Abnormal turnover 0.002  0.053  0.000  -0.053*** 
Panel B: Mutual fund quintile-portfolio (MF) and weighted mean 












1 (Low) 174 0.0233 0.0001 2,661 0.3956 0.0001 0.0000 
2 104 0.0264 0.0011 2,283 1.3027 0.0015 0.0004* 
3 89 0.0224 0.0089 2,522 1.6730 0.0115 0.0026* 
4 82 0.0375 0.0427 2,529 1.9027 0.0449 0.0022** 
5 (High) 54 0.0505 0.1743 2,556 2.5656 0.1851 0.0108* 
 
Panel C: Mutual fund quintile-portfolio (MF) and stock returns 













1 (Low) 174 0.0001 0.3590 2,661 0.0001 0.5477 0.1527 
2 104 0.0011 0.1390 2,283 0.0015 0.2542 0.1152 
3 89 0.0089 0.1033 2,522 0.0115 0.2819 0.1786* 
4 82 0.0427 0.0881 2,529 0.0449 0.3697 0.2816* 
5 (High) 54 0.1743 0.5086 2,556 0.1851 0.6875 0.1789 
 
Mutual funds (4.6%) include open-end funds (4.0%) and closed-end funds 
(0.2%).15 In the paper, the reason that the proportion of total outstanding shares held 
by open-end and closed-end funds is less than the proportion held by mutual funds is 
the existence of exchange-traded funds. The exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are a special 
form of open-end funds that can be traded on stock exchange. ETFs are an indexation 
                                                             
15 Closed-end funds, when set up, issue a fixed number of shares that are traded on secondary 
markets. Open-end funds, on the other hand, are not traded on the stock exchanges and the fund 
shares can be redeemed. 
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of investment instrument and invest in the constituent stocks of an index.16 However, 
as the proportion of shares held by ETFs is relatively small and such data is unavailable 
in the databases, the paper focuses on open-end and close-end funds only. 
Although the CSRC encourages the development of institutional investors, they 
do not own sufficient shares to exert influence or control over listed firms, as evidenced 
by the proportion of total outstanding shares: 16.5%. China’s capital markets are still 
dominated by the state controlling shareholders and individual investors. According to 
Jiang et al. (2017) in the last decade, state and legal person investors own more than 
45% of listed firms’ shares on average, and retail individual investors who are often 
characterized as short term-oriented and uninformed investors hold about 38% of listed 
firms’ shares. 
The characteristics of fraudulent versus non-fraudulent firms are also compared in 
Panel A. The sample consists of 12,551 firm-year observations not involved in 
accounting fraud and 503 firm-year observations punished because of accounting fraud. 
The average mutual fund ownership for the fraud sub-sample is 2.6% and 4.7% for the 
non-fraud subsample. The difference is statistically significant, implying firms are less 
likely to commit fraud when they have high mutual fund ownership. Similarly, 
fraudulent SOEs (1.0%) have significantly lower mutual fund ownership than non-
fraudulent SOEs (2.7%). Firm size is larger for the non-fraud sub-sample than for the 
fraud sub-sample. Fraudulent firms also have significantly higher CEO duality, but 
significantly lower supervisory board size than non-fraudulent firms. For ex-post 
financial performance, fraudulent firms have worse stock return performance, 
abnormally higher stock return volatility and higher stock turnover than the non-
fraudulent firms.17 Pearson correlation coefficients are also examined. The Appendix 
reports that the absolute values of all coefficients are lower than 0.35, indicating 
                                                             
16 The first exchange-traded fund was introduced in 2004 and listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. The ETFs have become an increasingly important way for many international 
institutional investors and retail investors to access the China’s A-share market (Li, 2010). 
17 T-test is used to measure the significance in the differences of means. 
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multicollinearity is not a problem. 
Panel B divides mutual funds into five quintiles and compares their weighted 
average investments between fraud firms and non-fraud firms. Relative weights that 
consider the differences among firms’ market shares are applied to estimate the mean 
value of mutual fund investment in each quintile-portfolio. It is revealed that the 
quintile-portfolio has higher level of investment in non-fraud firms than fraud firms and 
their differences are statistically significant. The dual-entry table in Panel C presents 
five quintiles of mutual fund investment and corresponding stock returns. It is reported 
that when the level of mutual fund investment is higher, it is not necessary that the 
corresponding stock returns are higher. In addition, in most of the quintile-portfolios, 
differences in stock returns between fraud firms and non-fraud firms are either non-
significant or marginally significant. This further implies high mutual fund investment 
in non-fraud firms is not caused by fund managers’ anticipation of future performance. 
 
4.2 Regression results 
Table 3 presents results for hypothesis 1. The coefficients of mutual fund 
ownership are significantly negative in the fraud commission equation and significantly 
positive in the fraud detection equation. This result indicates that when a greater 
proportion of a firm’s shares are owned by mutual funds, the probability of revealing 
fraudulent activities is significantly higher and the likelihood of listed firms committing 
fraud is significantly lower. This result supports Chinese policy to develop mutual funds. 
In contrast, other institutional investors such as foreign investors, securities firms, trust 
firms and financial firms are passive investors. This is perhaps due to their small 
shareholdings, recent entry into the market and less independence of business 
relationships with investee firms. 
Table 4 reports the results for hypothesis 2. Open-end funds are negatively related 
to a firm’s propensity to commit fraud and positively associated with the likelihood of 
fraud detection. In contrast, closed-end funds have no impact on fraud commission and 
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detection. These results suggest that redeemability is a powerful form of governance, 
which can hold managers accountable. The average percentage of ownership held by 
open-end funds (4.03%) is higher than that held by closed-end funds (0.15%), which 
may be the reason why open-end funds are more active in disciplining listed firms.18 
Table 5 presents the results for hypothesis 3. Samples are divided into SOEs and non-
SOEs to capture whether the monitoring function of mutual funds is shaped by state 
ownership. It is reported that the coefficients for mutual funds in SOEs are positive in 
the commission model but negative in the detection model. This indicates that mutual 
funds in SOEs have adverse impact on monitoring and detecting managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours. Some mutual funds may even tacitly collude with controlling 
shareholders or managers to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests. Government 
intervention therefore reduces the role of mutual funds in deterring accounting fraud, 
consistent with hypothesis 3. 
Turning to the control variables in the fraud commission equations, the results are 
consistent with the prior research (Jia et al., 2009, Shi and Wang, 2016). Larger firms 
are less likely to commit fraud, as these firms tend to be mature, diversified, operate 
with less profit volatility and receive tighter regulatory scrutiny. The coefficients of 
CEO duality are significantly positive in all models, indicating that CEOs with more 
internal power are more likely to commit fraud. Supervisory board size is negatively 
associated with fraud commission, implying large supervisory boards have incentives 
to monitor managers against accounting fraud. In addition, firms with higher R&D 
intensity are less likely to be caught by regulators. Subsequently, lower costs of fraud 
                                                             
18 As the closed-end fund ownership only represents 0.15% of the sample, the insignificant 
coefficients of closed-end funds may be due to their lack of power. Subsequently, this study 
uses the propensity score matching method to re-examine whether the findings hold. A control 
sample of open-end funds is created to match the set of treated firms with closed-end fund 
investment. The nearest matching method (1:1 matching) is applied and the prior model is re-
estimated using propensity score-matched observations. It is reported that with 5,084 
observations, open-end funds can significantly reduce the likelihood of fraud while closed-end 
funds have no impact on fraud commission or detection. Results are available upon request. 
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detection provide higher incentives for firms to commit fraud.19 
The fraud detection equation uses financial performance measures as control 
variables. It is reported that firm leverage is significantly and positively related to fraud 
detection. Sales growth is significantly and positively associated with fraud detection, 
indicating firms with high growth rates are more likely to trigger regulatory 
investigations. The coefficients of ROA are significantly negative. The likelihood of 
fraud detection is therefore significantly lower for highly profitable firms. Firms with 
higher annual stock returns are less likely to be caught for fraud, and firms that 
experience abnormal high return volatility and high stock turnover are more likely to 
be targeted for fraud detection. Specifically, firms experiencing higher return volatility 
are more likely to be complained by investors, thus triggering regulatory investigation. 
Firms with higher stock turnover imply more investors are affected by the firms’ stock 
prices and it is easier to identify a class of plentiful investors. As a result, investigations 
will be launched as regulators regard this behaviour as an indicator of fraud (Wang, 
2013). 
 
4.3 Addressing endogeneity: a propensity score matching model 
So far the interpretation of the results has assumed that mutual fund ownership is 
exogenous. However, mutual funds might be endogenous as there are observable 
differences between firms with high versus low mutual fund shareholdings. For 
example, Wang (2014) concludes that mutual funds block-holders virtually become 
corporate insiders and collude with managers to expropriate minority shareholders’ 
interests. Firth (2016) suggests that mutual funds with high shareholdings have more 
incentives to affect corporate decisions, contradicting to Wang (2014)’s argument. In 
                                                             
19 The reason R&D loses so much significance in Tables 4 and 5 is that the variable R&D is 
sensitive to the total number of variables included in the commission and detection equations. 
For instance, if the proportion of other institutional ownership is not controlled, three models 
yield consistent and significant R&D coefficients in fraud commission and detection equations. 
Therefore, the statistical significance of R&D coefficients needs to be interpreted with caution 
as they are sensitive to the model specification. 
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addition, prior studies using Chinese data have also reported mutual funds may be 
attracted to well-performing firms (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Therefore, the selection 
effects are mitigated using a propensity score matching approach (Lian et al., 2011). 
Table 3 
Regression results: mutual funds and accounting fraud. 
Variables P(F) P(D|F) 
Mutual funds -3.082*** 4.383*** 
 (0.535) (0.704) 
Other institutions -0.308 0.417 
 (0.465) (0.689) 
Firm size -0.054***  
 (0.013)  
Duality 0.062**  
 (0.031)  
Board meeting 0.030  
 (0.034)  
Big4 -0.021  
 (0.052)  
SBSIZE -0.022*  
 (0.013)  
R&D 10.307** -13.433*** 
 (4.022) (4.675) 
Political tie -0.104 0.202 
 (0.206) (0.303) 
Leverage  0.573*** 
  (0.140) 
Growth  0.026** 
  (0.013) 
ROA  -0.742*** 
  (0.183) 
Stock returns  -0.101*** 
  (0.026) 
Abnormal volatility  0.759*** 
  (0.272) 
Abnormal turnover  0.292** 
  (0.125) 
Constant 0.081 0.997*** 
 (0.281) (0.190) 
Log likelihood  -2015.365 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  103.30(19) 
Prob > chi2  0.000 




All of the variables are defined in the Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. P(F) is the probability of fraud commitment and P(D|F) is the probability of 
fraud detection conditional on fraud commitment. 
 
Table 4 
Regression results: Open-end and closed-end funds and accounting fraud. 
Variables P(F) P(D|F) 
Open-end funds -2.198*** 4.104*** 
 (0.569) (1.330) 
Closed-end funds 11.994 -14.020 
 (8.160) (9.405) 
Other institutions -0.337 0.500 
 (0.594) (0.982) 
Firm size -0.070***  
 (0.016)  
Duality 0.081*  
 (0.043)  
Board meeting 0.044  
 (0.044)  
Big4 -0.013  
 (0.072)  
SBSIZE -0.032**  
 (0.016)  
R&D 5.516 -7.510 
 (5.674) (7.015) 
Political tie 0.221 -0.279 
 (0.270) (0.389) 
Leverage  0.852*** 
  (0.209) 
Growth  -0.001 
  (0.001) 
ROA  -1.109*** 
  (0.312) 
Stock returns  -0.148*** 
  (0.044) 
Abnormal volatility  1.257*** 
  (0.367) 
Abnormal turnover  0.370** 
  (0.176) 
Constant 0.451 0.623** 
 (0.345) (0.307) 
Log likelihood  -2019.724 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  66.56(21) 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Observations 13,054 13,054 
 
All of the variables are defined in the Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. P(F) is the probability of fraud commitment and P(D|F) is the probability of fraud detection 
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conditional on fraud commitment. 
 
Table 5 
Regression results: mutual funds, SOEs and accounting fraud. 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
Variables P(F) P(D|F) P(F) P(D|F) 
Mutual funds 3.538* -6.142** -3.543*** 0.074* 
 (2.299) (2.398) (1.279) (1.049) 
Other institutions -1.527*** 2.997*** -2.018*** 0.817* 
 (0.406) (0.922) (0.525) (0.475) 
Firm size -0.058*  0.091  
 (0.033)  (0.105)  
Duality 0.090  0.104  
 (0.161)  (0.208)  
Board meeting -0.018  0.635***  
 (0.101)  (0.215)  
Big4 -0.639  0.460  
 (0.398)  (0.576)  
SBSIZE -0.011  -0.301***  
 (0.034)  (0.103)  
R&D -19.630* 28.571 -3.838 1.963 
 (11.238) (22.950) (3.976) (2.944) 
Political tie 0.534** -0.426 -0.729** 0.204 
 (0.269) (0.329) (0.334) (0.165) 
Leverage  1.566***  0.607*** 
  (0.477)  (0.120) 
Growth  0.069***  -0.003 
  (0.025)  (0.002) 
ROA  -2.184*  -0.796*** 
  (1.158)  (0.186) 
Stock returns  -0.239***  -0.088** 
  (0.086)  (0.044) 
Abnormal volatility  3.356*  0.373 
  (1.943)  (0.408) 
Abnormal turnover  0.265  0.582*** 
  (0.358)  (0.213) 
Constant 0.484 -1.322 -2.878 -1.971*** 
 (0.635) (1.757) (1.771) (0.099) 
Log likelihood  -917.715  -1062.903 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  98.56(19)  83.59(19) 
Prob>chi2  0.000  0.000 
Observations 7,373 7,373 5,681 5,681 
All of the variables are defined in the Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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levels respectively. P(F) is the probability of fraud commitment and P(D|F) is the probability of fraud detection 
conditional on fraud commitment. 
 
Table 6 
Endogeneity tests: propensity score matching results. 
Variables P(F) P(D|F) 
HI_Mutual -0.426** 0.626** 
 (0.194) (0.290) 
Other institutions -0.035 0.021 
 (0.499) (0.728) 
Firm size -0.065***  
 (0.022)  
Duality 0.053  
 (0.042)  
Board meetings 0.062  
 (0.048)  
Big4 -0.019  
 (0.064)  
SBSIZE -0.028  
 (0.017)  
R&D 10.583** -14.499** 
 (5.128) (6.036) 
Political ties -0.089 0.175 
 (0.223) (0.346) 
Leverage  0.654** 
  (0.316) 
Growth  0.038 
  (0.028) 
ROA  -0.846** 
  (0.409) 
Stock returns  -0.126** 
  (0.064) 
Abnormal volatility  0.672 
  (0.551) 
Abnormal turnover  0.328 
  (0.240) 
Constant 0.222 0.997*** 
 (0.428) (0.302) 
Log likelihood  -1395.509 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  41.55(19) 
Prob > chi2  0.002 
Observations 9,884 9,884 
HI_Mutual is a dummy variable which is coded one if mutual funds hold at least 5% of a firm’s equity 
and zero otherwise. The remaining control variables are defined in the Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote 
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statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. P(F) is the probability of fraud 
commitment and P(D|F) is the probability of fraud detection conditional on fraud commitment.  
 
This study constructs a set of control firms that can be matched optimally to the 
set of treated firms with high mutual fund shareholdings. To capture high mutual fund 
shareholdings, an indicator variable (HI_Mutual) coded one if mutual funds hold at 
least 5% of a firm’s equity and zero otherwise is created (Lin and Fu, 2017). A probit 
model is performed using HI_Mutual as the dependent variable and all other financial 
control variables as regressors.20 Subsequently, a firm’s propensity score is obtained 
and control samples are matched to treated samples based on the computed propensity 
scores. The nearest neighbor matching method (i.e. one to four matching) is applied to 
estimate average effect of mutual funds blockholding on fraud occurrence.  
The difference between the treated and control groups is -0.02 and is statistically 
significant (t= - 5.13) in the unmatched samples. After matching, the difference narrows 
to -0.01 yet remains statistically significant (t= - 2.35). The results indicate that large 
mutual funds can monitor and discipline managers. T-tests are conducted to verify 
whether differences between two groups remain large after conditioning of the 
propensity score. Balancing is evidenced by insignificant financial control variables 
after matching, indicating that treated and untreated groups have similar financial 
characteristics. The bivariate probit model of fraud commission and fraud detection is 
re-estimated using propensity score-matched observations. Results are reported in 
Table 6 and are consistent with prior evidence. 
 
4.4 Additional analysis 
The following robustness tests are also conducted. First, the dependent variable 
accounting fraud is replaced with corporate fraud to re-estimate the impact of mutual 
                                                             
20 This is because mutual funds prefer firms that are well-performing, such as having positive 
earnings, high return on assets and low risks (Yang et al., 2014).  
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funds on fraud commission and detection. Corporate fraud includes both accounting 
fraud and market manipulation (e.g. insider trading, illegal purchase and sale of shares 
and price manipulations). Results are presented in the Panel A of Table 7 and are 
consistent with prior findings and hypotheses. Mutual funds are active monitors against 
fraudulent activities and lead investee firms to better compliance with accounting and 
securities regulations.  
Second, the relationship between power balance and accounting fraud is examined. 
The balance of power between mutual funds and controlling shareholders is a 
shareholding arrangement over the controlling power of a firm (Xie and Zeng, 2010). 
To capture the impact of power balance on fraud, an indicator (Mutual fund/Top1) is 
created and calculated as the ratio of mutual fund ownership to largest shareholder 
ownership of a listed firm. The results are reported in the Panel B. When the degree of 
power balance between mutual funds and largest shareholder is higher, listed firms are 
more likely to become the targets of fraud detection. Subsequently, they commit less 
fraud. 
Third, the impact regarding the changes of mutual fund ownership on accounting 
fraud is examined. An indicator variable (Mutual_diff) is created to measure the 
changes of mutual fund ownership between year t and year t-1. The results are reported 
in the Panel C and are consistent with Aggarwal et al. (2015)’s findings. The coefficient 
of Mutual_diff is significantly negative in the fraud commission equation and 
significantly positive in the fraud detection equation. Therefore, an increase of a firm’s 
mutual fund shareholdings can better detect fraud and reduce the likelihood of fraud 
commission. 
Fourth, following Khanna et al. (2015), corporate governance variables are 
included in both fraud commission and fraud detection equations to re-estimate 
hypotheses. The results are reported in the Panel D and are in line with main findings: 
mutual funds have expertise to monitor managers’ activities.21 
                                                             
21 Financial variables are only included in the detection equation as firms with bad or abnormal 
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Table 7  
Additional analysis. 
Panel A: Mutual funds and corporate fraud 




Control variables Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  -4442.623 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  156.56(19)*** 
Observations 13,054 13,054 
Panel B: Power balance 
Variables P(F) P(D|F) 
Mutual funds/ Top 1 ownership 
-0.547*** 0.826*** 
(0.139) (0.242) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  -2017.174 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  75.59(19)*** 
Observations 13,054 13,054 
Panel C: Impact of changes in mutual fund ownership on accounting fraud 




Control variables Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  -2018.096 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  87.72(19)*** 
Observations 13,054 13,054 
Panel D: Governance variables in both fraud commission and detection models 
Variables P(F) P(D|F) 
Mutual funds -4.592*** 9.025*** 
 (0.969) (1.544) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  -1993.223 
Chi-squared (d.f.)  216.74(29)*** 
Observations 13,054 13,054 
Panel E: Changes in mutual fund ownership following accounting fraud 
Variables Value 
Accounting fraud -0.005**(0.002) 
 Control variables Yes 
 R-squared 0.073 
 Observations 13,054 
Mutual funds/Top 1 ownership is calculated as the ratio of mutual fund ownership to largest shareholder’s 
ownership of a listed firm. Mutual_diff measures the changes of mutual fund ownership between year t 
and year t-1. The remaining variables are defined in the Table 1. ***, ** and *, denote statistical 
                                                             
corporate financial performance are more likely to become the target of regulatory investigation 
rather than because they affect firms’ incentives to commit fraud. Firms sometimes commit 
fraud due to financial pressure based on the fraud triangle theory. While this paper incorporates 
leverage, ROA and sales growth into both commission and detection equations, the main 
findings on mutual funds remain unchanged. 
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significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Panel A to Panel D show the results of bivariate 
probit model: P(F) is the probability of fraud commitment and P(D|F) is the probability of fraud detection. 
Panel E displays the result of an OLS regression model.  
 
Fifth, changes in mutual fund ownership following fraud are examined. If mutual 
funds punish listed firms for their fraudulent behaviours, a decrease in ownership held 
by mutual funds after accounting fraud is expected. The changes of mutual fund 
ownership between year t+1 and year t are used as the dependent variable and regressed 
on accounting fraud and control variables. Panel E reports the regression results, which 
are consistent with expectations. Therefore, evidence that mutual funds significantly 
reduce their shareholdings of listed firms after the firms have committed accounting 




Mutual funds are an increasingly important presence in Chinese capital markets. 
They have considerably increased their ownership levels since the last decade and 
become more vocal and more likely to vote on corporate events with their voice rather 
than with their feet and exit (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Using a bivariate probit model, the 
relationship between mutual fund ownership and accounting fraud is examined between 
2007 and 2014. This study finds evidence that mutual fund ownership is associated with 
                                                             
22 Besides the five robustness tests, this study also uses the ‘disastrous stock returns’ to replace 
the ‘raw stock returns’ in the detection equation to re-estimate prior models. Although poor ex-
post financial performance is an indicator of fraud detection, it may not satisfy the exclusion 
restriction for identification between fraud commission and fraud detection due to fund 
managers’ ability to predict future corporate financial performance based on their private 
information. If this is the case, managers’ expectation about future stock returns may affect 
firms’ ex-anti incentives to commit accounting fraud. Therefore, disastrous stock returns are 
used to address this concern. Disastrous stock returns is a dummy variable that equals to one if 
annual stock return is below the bottom 10% of the sample distribution (i.e., <-50.8%) and zero 
otherwise (Wang, 2013). This is because it is difficult for mutual fund managers to predict 
disastrous events in the future, even with private information. Results are consistent with prior 
findings and are available upon request. 
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higher ability of fraud detection. Thus, the efforts of the CSRC in promoting mutual 
funds to invest in capital markets have additional benefits of restricting managerial 
opportunistic behaviours. In addition, compared to closed-end funds, open-end funds 
help reduce fraud and promote financial reporting quality. This evidence is consistent 
with the notion that redeemable shares can exert strong discipline on managers and they 
are a powerful form of governance. However, state ownership moderates the positive 
impact of mutual funds on fraud commission and fraud detection. Amongst firms with 
greater state ownership and control, the ability of mutual funds to discipline and 
influence managerial opportunistic behaviours is significantly reduced as managers in 
SOEs answer more to the state than to the stock market. Relative to mutual funds, other 
institutional investors such as QFII, securities firms, trust firms and financial firms are 
passive investors. This probably due to their small shareholdings, higher monitoring 
costs and conflicts of business interests with investee firms.  
These results are robust to alternative measures of fraud and mutual funds. 
Endogeneity concerns are addressed using a propensity score matching approach. Firms 
with high mutual fund shareholdings have active monitoring roles. Moreover, when 
mutual fund ownership is changed into alternative measures, such as power balance 
between mutual funds and controlling shareholders and the changes of mutual fund 
ownership, results remain unchanged. Mutual funds are likely to punish listed firms for 
the fraudulent behaviours they committed, which is evidenced by the reduced 
shareholdings of listed firms following fraud.  
These results have implications for future research. First, while mutual funds can 
restrict accounting fraud, the channels through which mutual funds carry out 
monitoring activities are not examined. For instance, mutual funds’ meetings with 
internal audit committee members and independent directors who have financial 
expertise could be the plausible channels through which mutual funds affect managers’ 
activities of investee firms (Wang, 2014). It would also be interesting to identify the 
channels of mutual funds monitoring. As some of these meetings are behind closed-
doors and are not quantified, future studies would benefit from hand-collected data of 
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mutual funds’ meetings.  
Second, this study classifies mutual funds into open-end funds and closed-end 
funds based on the redeemability of the shares. There are other classification methods 
based on portfolio turnover (Dai et al., 2013) and past investment behaviours (Chi et 
al., 2014). Dai et al. (2013) find that relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term 
mutual funds play a stronger supervisory role and reduce negative management 
behaviours. Chi et al. (2014) report that transient mutual funds’ ownership is positively 
related to firms’ earning management activities. A future study using these different 
classifications of mutual funds could highlight the possible impacts on deterring 
accounting fraud.  
Third, whether mutual funds can collect and analyze information, and thereby 
select outperforming stocks and earn risk-adjusted excess returns, is an important 
question for the financial industry as well as for academia due to its practical 
implications for investors and its theoretical implications for market efficiency. 
Compared with developed economies, Chinese markets are dominated by speculative 
individual investors. In addition, Chinese markets experience frequent and large 
fluctuations relative to developed markets like the U.S. (Li et al., 2017). Therefore, it 
would be interesting if future research can examine the stock-picking ability of mutual 
fund managers in China. 
The results provide insights for regulators and policy makers. First, mutual fund 
ownership plays a beneficial role in detecting fraud and limiting expropriation by firm 
managers. This endorses the CSRC’s efforts in promoting mutual funds as a major 
institutional investor to enhance corporate governance in China. However, compared to 
capital markets in the U.S.A, mutual funds in China remain small, implying a 
development gap. In addition, China’s capital markets are dominated by individual 
investors who cause ‘herding behaviours’ and strong stock price fluctuations (Hu and 
Chen, 2016). Therefore, regulators should encourage individual investors’ collective 
investments in mutual funds to reduce fraud and improve financial reporting quality. 
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Second, as closed-end funds cannot be redeemed, opportunities exist for firm 
managers engaging in accounting fraud. Therefore, regulators should monitor closed-
end funds closely as they have the potential to overlook fraud. Open-end funds should 
be given priority to develop in China to reduce the dominance of individual investors. 
In an institutional environment with weaker legal enforcement and imperfect 
shareholder protection, the external governance function played by open-end funds is 
especially important. 
Third, state ownership appears to impede the monitoring efficiency of mutual 
funds and transfer agency costs to minority shareholders. For regulators, a reduction of 
state influence over listed firms could strengthen mutual funds’ disciplining function 
(Chan et al., 2014). Chinese standard setters are currently undertaking a ‘mixed-
ownership’ reform on central SOEs. The reform includes diversifying the shareholding 
structure of SOEs through bringing in professional and general institutions to create a 
flexible and efficient market-oriented mechanism and improving management of SOEs 
(Xinhua, 2017). Such a reform can provide mutual funds greater say in corporate 
decision making and enhance firm financial reporting quality. 
To conclude, accounting fraud erodes market confidence, undermines trust and 
damages the image of accounting profession. Over the last decade, international 
experience has confirmed the importance of improving corporate governance in 
deterring fraud. This paper identifies mutual funds can detect managers’ opportunistic 
behaviours, thus reducing listed firms’ propensity of engaging in fraud. It is hoped that 
the results assist regulators in developing remedies that are suitable for the healthy 
development of the Chinese capital market.
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Appendix: Correlation matrix 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] 
[1]Accounting fraud 1          
[2]Mutual funds -0.051*** 1         
[3]Other institutions -0.01 -0.039*** 1        
[4]Firm size -0.058*** 0.221*** 0.057*** 1       
[5]Duality 0.026*** 0 0.020** -0.132*** 1      
[6]Meetings 0.01 0.065*** 0.008 0.166*** -0.009 1     
[7]Big4 -0.024*** 0.034*** 0.100*** 0.348*** -0.035*** 0.047*** 1    
[8]SB size -0.033*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.225*** -0.131*** -0.030*** 0.079*** 1   
[9]R&D -0.011 0.116*** 0.021** -0.044*** 0.117*** -0.039*** 0.030*** -0.089*** 1  
[10]Political ties 0.004 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.244*** 0.021** 0.018** -0.057*** 0.052*** 1 
[11]Leverage 0.002 -0.012 -0.001 -0.103*** 0.016* 0.001 -0.005 -0.009 -0.016* -0.009 
[11]Growth -0.002 -0.004 0.029*** -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 0 
[13]ROA -0.008 0.027*** 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.012 0.005 
[14]Stock returns -0.034*** 0.120*** -0.043*** -0.099*** -0.021** -0.011 -0.039*** 0.028*** -0.085*** -0.048*** 
[15]Volatility 0.022** -0.046*** -0.011 -0.075*** 0.018** 0.024*** -0.034*** -0.020** -0.009 0.004 
[16]Turnover 0.054*** -0.206*** -0.125*** -0.310*** 0.023*** -0.026*** -0.182*** -0.071*** -0.037*** -0.026*** 
 [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[11]Leverage 1      
[11]Growth 0 1     
[13]ROA -0.041*** 0 1    
[14]Stock returns 0.004 -0.002 0.011 1   
[15]Volatility 0.007 0.004 0 0.288*** 1  
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